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An Identity Crisis of International Organizations

I. Introduction: Rethinking International Organizations

International organizations (IOs) are ubiquitous. More than two
hundred IOs1 touch our everyday lives. Their missions vary. The United
Nations (UN) plays a significant role in securing global peace and order
as it address international conflicts and fights terrorism. 2 The World
Bank is the world’s largest external funder of education.3 Other IOs also
impact numerous daily issues, such as air travel (The International Civil
Aviation Organization), banking (The Bank for International
Settlements), mail (The Universal Postal Union), flu-shots (The World
Health Organization), and mobile phones (The International
Telecommunications Union), to name a few.4 It would be only a “modest
exaggeration” to claim that IOs now cover every practical aspect of
human enterprise.5
However, conventional political scientists seldom pay IOs
sufficient attention that, given their contemporary prominence, they
thoroughly deserve. Conventional international relations (IR) scholars
tend to consider IOs as mere passive machineries which states create
and maneuver according to their functional needs. Under this position,
while IOs may facilitate inter-state cooperation and reduce transaction
costs, they never have a life of their own. 6 Conventional IR theories
hardly offer a satisfactory explanation for the distinctive phenomenon of
IOs’ institutional dynamics in which a specific IO, as a separate and
autonomous organic entity, grows, evolves and eventually makes sense
of its own existence.
See e.g., The Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International
Organizations, Appendix 3: Table 1 (Number of International Organizations in This
Edition by Type (2005/2006), available at
http://www.uia.org/statistics/organizations/types-2004.pdf. In this Essay, I mean by
international organizations “intergovernmental” organizations.
2 See e.g., United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1822, adopted on Jun. 20, 2008
(S/RES/1822 (2008)), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/404/90/PDF/N0840490.pdf?Ope
nElement (resolving to freeze financial assets used for terrorist activities).
3 World Bank, Ten Things That You Never Knew about the World Bank, available at
http://digitalmedia.worldbank.org/tenthings/en/1.php.
4 See generally THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
100 WAYS IT SHPAES OUR LIVES (2006).
5 FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING v (2nd
ed. 1993).
6 See Gayl D. Ness & Steven R. Brechin, Bridging the Gap: International
Organizations as Organizations, 42 INT’L ORG. 245, 246 (1988); Harold K. Jacobson et
al., National Entanglements and International Government Organizations, 80 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 141-59 (1986).
1
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Accordingly, conventional IR theories largely fail to deliver
adequate narratives on how a particular IO, such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO), molds its institutional self as it interacts with the
environment in which it is situated. Unsurprisingly, conventional IR
scholars tend to limit their analytical focus to the creation of an IO and
the inter-state dynamics leading up to its creation. Accordingly, an IO’s
institutional change remains an “under-studied” and “under-theorized”
issue of the conventional IR framework. 7 This is an unfortunate
deficiency in light of ever-increasing significance of IOs in the
contemporary world.
This Essay offers a novel perspective which attempts to overcome
the aforementioned deficiency in conventional IR theories. Drawing on
the “identity theory” established by Erik Erikson, this Essay captures an
IO’s institutional development in which one can witness a dynamic
process of its identity crisis and identity formation. The Essay argues
that based on its autonomy qua organization, not merely as an
instrument of states, an IO forms its organizational identity as it
experiences an “identity crisis” in a similar way in which a human-being
does. Initially, states create an IO to serve a specific function. Thus, an
IO may hold a default purpose which its creators (states) have
programmed into it. However, an IO’s retention of such programmed
purpose results from a mere identification with its creators, not from the
genuine identity which it has formed at subsequent stages during the
course of its institutional evolution. An IO acquires its organizational
identity only after it achieves a necessary level of institutional maturity
as a result of incessant interactions and communications with its
environment (society).
Certainly, it is a process no less daunting to an IO than to a
human-being because an IO also suffers strains and pressures over its
role expectation in the international society. Just as an adolescent
experiences an identity crisis in his or her interaction with peers and
society in general, an IO is exposed to a similar ordeal in adjusting its
goals to various external pressures. In particular, an IO often undergoes
a testing situation under which its old structure has become increasingly
incapable of coping with new demands from the altered environment.
Confronted with this crisis, an IO may attempt to reconfigure its
institutional setting by fine-tuning its original teleology to a call from
the new environment. Only then will its institutional existence continue
to hold relevance and therefore enable it to achieve its genuine
institutional identity.

Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations:
Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 655 (2006).

7
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Markedly, law and legal discourse provide an important platform
in which one can investigate, comprehend and elucidate the formation
of an IO’s organizational identity. As a product of legal documents
(charters or conventions) and a holder of legal personality, an IO bases
its everyday operations on legal principles and legal reasoning. Its
routinized and regularized operations, such as “making consistent
decisions on similar facts” and “giving reasoned arguments based on
principles other than mere promotion of [a state]’s self-interest,” furnish
an IO with rich normative foundations essential in shaping its unique
identity. 8 This identity, once achieved, is self-referential in that it
functions as a normative standard which regulates an IO’s future
behaviors. In this sense, an IO’s policies are a teleological realization of
its identity. Such a teleological identity-formation may even help launch
various reform agendas as it can locate particular conditions under
which an individual IO can perform effectively in certain stages of its
institutional development.9
Against this background, this Essay attempts to theorize an IO’s
institutional development qua organization from the standpoint of
identity formation. This Essay also tests the theory it proposes by
applying it to the WTO. At this juncture, an important disclaimer is in
order. The Essay does not venture to analyze every aspect of an IO’s
identity formation. Admittedly, such process may connote many other
deeper and broader issues which exceed the scope of the Essay. In
particular, it leaves unanswered a delicate interplay between an IO and
its members in the course of the former’s identity formation process.
Rather, the Essay aims to offer a panoramic view on this critical process
and serve as a preliminary yet useful avenue for further discussions in
this largely nascent field of IO theories.
The Essay unfolds in the following sequence. Part II discusses a
theoretical foundation of the whole analysis, i.e., the autonomy of an IO.
One cannot construct an IO’s genuine identity without certain autonomy
from its members (states). Specifically, Part II draws on the views of
constructivism and organizational sociology, which focus on the
autonomy of organizations in contrast with conventional IR theories
which regard IOs as mere instruments of states. Part II also highlights
that the identity formation is a normative process which rules and legal
discourse operate.
Part III then constructs a theory of identity formation of IOs. Part
III introduces anthropomorphism in the IO’s identity formation, which
lays a firm ground for a cross-disciplinary investigation informed by
developmental psychology. After sketching Erik Erikson’s celebrated
FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING viii (2d
ed. 1993).
9 See Ness & Brechin, supra note _, at 271.

8
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identity theory, Part III applies the theory to the IOs’ context. It also
delineates various parameters of identity formation, such as history,
environment, goals and technology. Finally, Part IV applies the theory of
IOs’ identity formation to the WTO. Part IV demonstrates how the WTO
has experienced an identity crisis as the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)’s original pro-trade bias embraced new challenges
involving non-trade values, such as protection of the environment and
human health. Part IV contends that the WTO’s identity formation
(achievement) is to strike an institutional equilibrium between
traditional trade values and these non-trade values. Part V concludes.
II. Autonomy and Identity of International Organizations

A. A Political Perspective
Conventional international relations (IR) theories, particularly
realism and regime theories, regard IOs as passive machinery, or “empty
shells,” of interstate cooperation. From a narrow functionalist
standpoint, these theories pose that sovereign states create and operate
IOs for a better world system by “enmeshing” them in mutually
beneficial economic transactions.10 As Robert Keohane aptly observed,
this “rationalistic” approach highlights IOs’ functional merits, such as
reducing uncertainty and transaction costs, in the absence of any
specific institutional context. 11 This is basically an “economistic”
approach based on the assumption that states prioritize their interests in
order to maximize efficiency and thus use IOs as a rational instrument
to achieve such goals.12
Perhaps this rather inorganic view of IOs may be a logical
conclusion to most IR theories which are state-oriented: they are
basically “theories about states.”13 They aim to analyze and understand
why and how states interact and cooperate among themselves, which is
aptly encapsulated in their appellation itself, “inter-national relations.”
Ness & Brechin, supra note _, at 246; Harold K. Jacobson et al., supra note _, at _.
Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q.
379, 390 (1988).
12 Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of
International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 702 (1999); THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS _ (1991) (Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W.
Powell eds. 1991); Anna Grandori, Notes on the Use of Power and Efficiency
Constructs in the Economics and Sociology of International Organizations, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES _ (S. Lindenberg & H.
Shreuder eds. 1993).
13 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note _, at 706.
10
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Therefore, such “statist ontology” 14 embedded in conventional IR
theories treat IOs as instruments, not as self-governing, purposive actors
enjoying “ontological independence.” 15 Under this framework, even if
IOs may facilitate or constrain certain state behaviors by creating and
controlling the flow of information between states, such “causal status”
still does not grant IOs autonomy.16 To conventional IR theorists, any
meaningful contributions by IOs are made, after all, through and by
states. In an attempt to deepen their understanding the dynamics of IOs,
some IR scholars employ the rational choice theory. Their framework,
which defines IOs as “agents” of states (“principals”), conceptually
enables IOs to become autonomous actors in the first place.17 However,
this approach is soon confronted by a dilemma in that conventional IR
theories are unable to provide a theoretical foundation for the very
independence of agents (IOs). Without this foundation the whole agentprincipal relationship framework collapses.18
Absent autonomy, actual operation (evolution) of IOs in its postcreation stages “remains under-examined and under-theorized.”19 While
“identify[ing] hypotheses about IO change” may be inferred from the
conventional IR theories centering on why and how states create IOs,20
those hypotheses nonetheless remain unsatisfactory since an
institutional change itself tends to be at odds with conventional IR
theories. Change is either “assumed away”21 or thrust upon IOs by their
creators, i.e., states, in accordance with changes in national interests or
state preferences.22 Therefore, change is nothing but a re-creation of IOs
by states due to asymmetrical external shocks, such as disasters,23 rather
than an evolutionary or adaptive process resulting from continuous,
incremental institutional development. In sum, any institutional

Id., at 700.
Id., at 704.
16 Id.
17 Roland Vaubel, A Public Choice View of International Organization, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION _ (Roland Vaubel & Thomas
Willett eds. 1991); Patricia Dillon et al., Approaches to the Study of International
Organizations: Major Paradigms in Economics and Political Science, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION _ (Roland Vaubel & Thomas
Willett eds. 1991).
18 Id.
19 Helfer, supra note _ , at 658.
20 Id.
21 Id., at 661; Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast, Intersections between Historical
and Rational Choice Institutionalism, in PREFERENCES AND SITUATIONS: POINTS OF
INTERSECTION BETWEEN HISTORICAL AND RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM 1, 7 (Ira
Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast eds., 2005).
22 Helfer, supra note _ , at 661.
23 Id., at 662.
14

15
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changes of IOs are reduced back to international cooperation among
states.24
Moreover, since conventional IR theories regard IOs as mere
instruments, like nuts and bolts, they often fail to heed the unique
attributes and contexts which are deeply associated with each
organization’s autonomy and identity. Therefore, they tend to treat even
effective IOs in the same way as “those that are near moribund.”25 “Few
have noted that organizations differ over time, or that they perform
differently from one another, or that they achieve their ends with
varying effectiveness or efficiency.”26
In contrast with an inorganic approach to IOs by conventional IR
theorists, which leaves little room for organizational autonomy-cumidentity, an organic, sociological approach enables a theoretical
emancipation of IOs from their creators (states). IOs are “live
collectivities” interrelating with the environment. 27 This approach
focuses on the “social content” of the organization, i.e., “its culture, its
legitimacy concerns, dominant norms that govern behavior and shape
interests, and the relationship of these to a larger normative and cultural
environment.” 28 According to the Weberian bureaucracy theory and
sociological institutionalist approaches, the “rational-legal” authority
which the bureaucracy of IOs generates endogenously attains an
independent status separate from their actors (states). 29 Here,
bureaucracy is defined as an internal mechanism of IOs which creates
norms and social knowledge. 30 The existence of an independent
bureaucracy in IOs (such as “Eurocrats” in the European Union31) or an
independent organizational culture (such as the World Bank32) tends to
debunk the conventional view that IOs are a mere passive machinery of
states.33.
Yet, IOs’ autonomy gains more theoretical salience in the
“natural” (open) system perspective than the Weberian “rational”
system perspective. While Max Weber highlights the rational-legal
authority of bureaucracy, this authority may still be translated as a tool
to states in that it is “blue-printed” to achieve rationally pre-deliberated
Keohane, supra note _ , at 379.
Ness & Brechin, supra note _, at 247.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note _ , at 706.
29 Id., at 699.
30 Id.
31 See Mark Pollack, Delegation, Agency, and Agenda-Setting in the European
Community, 51 INT’L ORG. 99, _ (1997).
32 See Robert Wade, Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance:
The East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective, 217 NEW LEFT REV. 3, _ (1996).
33 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note _, at 705.
24
25
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and pre-programmed goals. 34 In contrast, the “natural” system
perspective views an IO as “social groups attempting to adapt and
survive in their particular circumstances.”35 Therefore, organizations are
capable of modifying their original goals to survive in the changing
environment. They become “ends in themselves.” 36 Philip Selznick’s
celebrated “institutional” approach perfects this theory of organizational
autonomy from the standpoint of this natural (open) system.
Institutionalization distinguishes organizations from mere cybernetic
machinery that passively channels states’ inputs. Selznick defines
institutionalization as “the emergence of orderly, stable, socially
integrating patterns out of unstable, loosely organized, or narrowly
technical activities.” 37 Through the process of institutionalization, an
organization obtains both special capacity and character, 38 while also
establishing its value.39
Focusing on the autonomy of an individual organization means
taking “variance” among IOs seriously, including variance in their
performance (such as effectiveness or efficiency) as well as variables
influencing such performance (such as environments).40 In particular,
the “environmental changes [that] produced changes in organizational
structure and behavior.” 41 Admittedly, the “regime theory,” an
adaptation from realism, also focuses on “specific” institutions in which
states routinely cooperate over certain issues in order to reduce
uncertainty and transaction costs, provide information, and stabilize
expectations, even in the absence of “hierarchical authority.”42 Critically,
however, this sector-specific regime still remains a cooperative
relationship among sovereign states – no matter how strong their
cooperation may be – and not an independent organization. As a
corollary, the regime theory fails to address two important
organizational issues. First, it cannot fully explain an organic interaction
between IOs and the environment. Second, it cannot evaluate whether
RICAHRD W. SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 53 (3d
ed. 1992); Alvin W. Gouldner, Organizational Analysis, in ROBERT MERTON ET AL.,
SOCIOLOGY TODAY 404-05 (1959).
35 SCOTT, supra note _, at 57.
36 Id.
37 LOONARD BROOM & PHILIP SELZNICK, SOCIOLOGY 238 (1955).
38 Philip Selznick, Institutionalism “Old” and “New,” 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 270, _ (1996).
39 PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION 17 (1957).
40 Ness & Brechin, supra note _, at 248.
41 Id., at 254. See also Matthias Finger & Bérangère Ruchat, The Transformation of
International Public Organizations: The Case of UNCTAD, Working Paper de
l’IDHEAP 14/2000, Nov. 2000, at 3. (discussing “organizational transformation”
which an IO experiences in order to “bring organizational structure, culture, and
purpose in line with perceived environmental requirements”).
42 Keohane, supra note _, at 386.
34
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each regime is legitimate and/or effective qua organization since all the
performance of the regime is attributable logically to states.
In fact, the notion of organizational autonomy parallels the way
in which ordinary people perceive IOs. While people may criticize the
WTO for its various deficiencies as an organization, they seldom criticize
its members, especially big ones, such as the United States and the
European Union for those deficiencies. This is why organizational
autonomy may offer a deeper theoretical underpinning for a
constitutional analysis of IOs than the positivistic framework asserted by
the regime theory .
B. A Legal Perspective
The Westphalian tradition of public international law, built on
the notion of state sovereignty, could not conceive the existence of any
separate polity or organization which would affect states’ monopoly of
power. The only restriction to the sovereign power was self-restriction:
treaties created by sovereign states’ consent could only regulate states
concerned not because those treaties constituted an autonomous
organization of higher hierarchy but because sovereign states had given
their word. However, after states had witnessed the fatal flaw of this
Hobbesian view of the international community and international law,
especially through two world wars, states decided to create independent
international entities which would coordinate and govern states’
behaviors in certain sector-specific areas, such as collective security (the
United Nations (UN)) and international financial regulation (the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)).
Therefore, the modern tenets of public international law, in
particular those related to IOs’ legal personality, tend to provide useful
insights on IOs’ organizational autonomy.43 The ICJ, in its Reparation
case, ruled that an IO is “a subject of international law and capable of
possessing international rights and duties.” 44 Based on this legal
capability, an IO holds the capacity to sue a state, regardless of its
membership to the organization, for damage caused by a violation by the
state of its obligation toward the organization.45 It is in this line that the
International Law Commission (ILC) is working to create a draft
governing legal responsibility for damage that an IO may cause to states
43 But see Giuseppe Marchegiano, The Juristic Character of the International
Commission of the Cape Spartel Lighthouse, 25 AM. J. INT’L L. 339, 339 (1931) (finding
the notion of international personalities as debatable).
44 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations [1949], ICJ Rep
174, at 179.
45 Id.
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or other IOs.46 Charters of most IOs confirm this position. For example,
Article 104 of the UN stipulates that “the Organization shall enjoy in the
territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary
for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.”47
Article 8:1 of the WTO Agreement also provides that “the WTO shall
have legal personality, and shall be accorded by each of its Members
such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its
functions.”48
Public international law also recognizes yet another important
attribute derived from the notion of autonomy, i.e., an “identity” of IOs,
by accentuating IOs’ distinctive functional mandate or competence. For
example, the ICJ rejected the World Health Organization (WHO)’s
request to the court to deliver an advisory opinion as to whether states’
use of nuclear weapons violates international law on the ground that
such an issue did not fall within the rubric of the WHO’s activities.49
This decision acknowledges a distinguishable mission of each IO which
tends to merit organizational autonomy based on regulatory
professionalism to the extent that an empty shell, as conventional IR
theorists view IOs, cannot fully capture in exclusive reliance upon interstate cooperation.
Admittedly, the mere existence of an IO’s legal personality should
not necessarily be equated with “a life apart from the will of the
individual states which formed the membership of the organization.”50
Legal capacity may not be a sufficient condition for genuine autonomy.
Varying institutional arrangements of IOs determine different patterns
of governance and different degrees of autonomy. Although the UN
holds its own legal personality, it is incapable of making any
autonomous decisions over critical subjects, such as security, against
wills of a handful of powerful members who retain veto powers.
Furthermore, even if an IO does enjoy a certain level of autonomy,

46 International Law Commission (ILC), Analytical Guide: Responsibility of
International Organizations, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/9_11.htm.
47 Charter of United Nations, art. 104, available at
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
48 Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994,
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, art. VIII:1 [hereinafter WTO Agreement], LEGAL INSTRUMENTS–RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 6, 6-18; 33 I.L.M. 1140, 1144-1153 (1994).
49 The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1 ICJ Rep.
226 [1996].
50 David J. Bederman, The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality
and the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 277 (1995-1996).
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sovereign states, which “transfer” part of their own autonomy to the IO,
may want to retract such a transfer.51
Nonetheless, an IO’s legal-institutional detachment from its
members is still an important avenue for its socio-political autonomy in
action. In line with Weberian legal-rational authority in bureaucracy,
legal personality tends to benefit an IO in claiming its decisional
authority upon various issues and challenges falling within the rubric of
its mandate. In addition, along with this legal capacity follows other
institutional software and hardware with which to maintain its
operational autonomy, such as operational rules, secretariat and the
budget.
Approaching IOs’ autonomy through a legal lens has a number of
benefits. First, it certainly corroborates the aforementioned
constructivist, sociological IR theories which recognize the autonomy of
IOs. In fact, as discussed above, it is legal personality which mobilizes
and institutes an indispensable set of bureaucratic resources and
appliances necessary to sustain IOs’ autonomous operation. As a legal
entity, an IO can retain legal rights and obligations. For example, an IO
may demand its members to pay their dues. More importantly, an IO’s
legal personhood enables us to employ “legal principles and legal
arguments” with which we investigate and study “the ways in which
international organizations conduct their affairs.” 52 Those legal
narratives offer unique perspectives in understanding IOs’ autonomy,
such as “making consistent decisions on similar facts” and “giving
reasoned arguments based on principles other than mere promotion of
[a state]’s self-interest,” which conventional IR theories may not fully
capture in their own languages.53
These legal discourses inform, inter alia, two paramount issues
which concern and shape the autonomy of IOs: what IOs produce and
how they develop. First, some legal scholars have already highlighted
various noticeable “jurisgenerative”54 phenomena in certain areas within
sector-specific regulatory IOs. These scholars often focus on vibrant
government regulatory networks harbored by those IOs in which
epistemic socialization among likely-minded government officials and
other professionals crystallize into tangible normative products, such as
guidelines and recommendations.55 Markedly, legally defined mandates
ANNA MEIJKNECHT, TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY: THE POSITION OF
MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS 38 (2001).
52 KIRGIS, supra note _ , at vii-viii.
53 Id., at viii.
54 See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW:
THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 110 (Martha Minow et al eds., 1992).
55 See notably Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through
Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (Michael Byers ed. 2000);
51
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and membership flowing from, and anchored by, its legal personality
tend to secure specialization and professional authority for these IOs.
These regulatory IOs are represented not by government officials from
the Department of State or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but by
transgovernmental regulators from sector-specific departments, such as
the Department of Treasury or the Ministry of Finance, who “share a
common concern that spans geographical boundaries and transcends
cultural barriers.” 56 An IO’s legal personality tends to promote this
“mentalités collectives” by providing professional forums which enjoy a
certain level of detachment from a culture of direct delegation from the
headquarters.57
For example, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) harbors a transgovernmental network of
securities regulators whose collective goals are articulated in a
professional, not ambassadorial, fashion, i.e., to “establish standards
and an effective surveillance of international securities transactions.”58
The IOSCO has issued a number of professional standards within its
mandate, such as the “Risk Management and Control Guidance for
Securities Firms and their Supervisors.” 59 Despite its non-binding
nature, firms in each jurisdiction expect to implement these regulatory
prototypes.60 This normative authority, as it is repeated and reinforced,
tends to equip these IOs with an aura of professional legitimacy which in
turn leads to a certain level of self-rule.

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Sungjoon Cho,
Transgovernmentalism: A New Jurisgenerative Mechanism (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the author). This idea of government (transgovernmental) networks dates
back to the 1970’s. See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental
Relations and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL.39, 44 (1974); Raymond F.
Hopkins, Global Management Networks: The Internationalization of Domestic
Bureaucracies, 30 INT. SOC. SCI. J. 31, 31 (1978). Some scholars describe this term
differently, but for more or less the same meaning. For instance, One scholar named
the Basel Accord as a “gentlemen’s agreement among central banks”. Hal Scott, The
Competitive Implications of the Basel Capital Accord, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 885, 885
(1995). Another scholar termed the same work as “international soft law”. JOSEPH JUDE
NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS 176-77 261-262
(1995).
56 John E. Shockey, Bank Regulatory Examination and Enforcement after Barings
and Daiwa, 935 PLI / CORP. 681, 708 (1996).
57 John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in
International Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 157 (1993).
58 The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), General
Information on IOSCO, available at http://www.iosco.org/about/.
59 IOSCO, Risk Management and Control Guidance for Securities Firms and their
Supervisors: A Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO (May 1998), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD78.pdf.
60 Id., at 1.
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Second, the legal personality of an IO is also inductive to a
dynamic understanding of its authentic institutional self, i.e., its identity.
Since the juridical personhood warrants a certain level of permanence in
its institutional existence, in particular vis-à-vis mere agreements
(treaties), one can engage in a serious exploration of its unique pathway
from creation through the subsequent institutional evolution as a legally
distinct entity (person). This facilitates a panoramic comprehension of
the IO’s operational autonomy. From a normative perspective, forming
an IO’s identity means establishing institutional criteria for behaviors or
policies acceptable to the IO. Throughout its institutional lifetime, an IO
embraces a different set of policies determined by its own understanding
of its rationale (object and purpose). Importantly, this understanding is
neither inalterable nor self-containing. An IO continuously defines and
redefines such teleological realizations as it incessantly interacts with its
environment. Yet just as an adolescent experiences an identity crisis in
his or her interaction with peers, an IO may be exposed to confusion and
stresses in adjusting its goals to external demands.
IOs’ norms and legal discourses are crystallized into the
“technology” which represents IOs’ varying operational apparatuses,
such as software (e.g., rules and guidelines), 61 hardware (e.g.,
committees) and humanware (e.g., staff). In the identity-forming
process, it is this technology which guides and regulates IOs’ behaviors
(policies). For example, an internal “teleological interpretation” has
modified the identity of World Bank from a narrow development
organization as stipulated in Article 1 of its charter (Articles of
Agreement), which would more or less tackle members’ economic wellbeing calculated by per capita income, to a more broadly mandated
organization which now addresses comprehensive socio-cultural issues,
such as women’s rights, the environment, education, and health.62
III. Theorizing an Identity Crisis of International
Organizations

A. Anthropomorphism: IOs as Identity-Bearers
As discussed above, legal narratives tend to make unique
contributions in understanding the operational autonomy of IOs in their
See e.g., Georg Ress, The Interpretation of the Charter, in THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS – A COMMENTARY 28 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994) (discussing
“evolutionary dynamic interpretation”).
62 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Dynamic Evolution of International Organizations:
The Case of the World Bank, 2 J. HIS. INT’L L. 217, 249 (2000).

61
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organizational lifetimes, i.e., how they evolve and what they generate,
which eventually supply the foundation for the formation of their
identities. One possible way of advancing the IOs’ identity formation is
to project this normative process to a well-established paradigm of
human developmental psychology. A careful reflection on an IO’s nature
tends to warrant this anthropomorphism.
As a juridical person, an IO is an autonomous, organic entity
which owes its existence to its own incessant adaptations to the everchanging environment in a similar way in which a human being does.
Unlike a closed system, such as a cybernetic system, in which inputs
from the environment can never change internal elements of an
organization, both humans and organizations are “open systems” which
are “capable of self-maintenance on the basis of throughput of resources
from the environment.” 63 The shift from closed to open systems
highlights the critical significance which the environment exerts on
organizational identity,64 as it does on the human identity. Like a human
being, an organization pursues a homeostatic equilibrium vis-à-vis the
external environment as it builds and adapts its individuality in its
institutional development.65
In fact, some organization theorists have already devoted their
attention to certain self-conceptions collectively held by members of an
organization in the name of “organizational identity,” which is defined
as a “central, enduring, and distinctive” set of values “that distinguishes
the organization from others with which it might be compared.”66 This
notion of organizational identity offers yet more support for using an
identity theory analogy in studying the dynamic transformation of IOs.
B. Insights from Developmental Psychology: The Identity
Theory
A pre-eminent developmental psychologist, Erik Erikson,
suggests that a human being develops her (ego) identity by combining
her understanding of the environment (group identity) and her own
personal characters (personal identity). 67 A person’s identity is
SCOTT, supra note _, at 89; WALTER BUCKLEY, SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SYSTEMS
THEORY 50 (1967).
64 Ness & Brechin, supra note _ , at 249.
65 SCOTT, supra note _ , at 60.
66 Stuart Albert & David A. Whetten, Organizational Identity, in RESEARCH IN
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR (vol. 6) 265 (L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw eds. 1985).
67 See notably ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY, YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968). See also Willem L.
Wardekker, Identity, Plurality, and Education, in THE YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF
EDUCATION (1995), available at http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PESYearbook/95_docs/wardekker.html.
63
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“constituted by a configuration of central traits … that typically make a
systematic difference to the course of a person’s life, to the habitforming and action-guiding social categories in which she is placed, to
the way that she acts, reacts, and interacts.” 68 Erikson’s approach is
often dubbed “psychosocial”: he basically posits that the “individual and
society are intricately woven, dynamically related in continual
change.” 69 His theory “interrelate[d] societal demands and individual
internal forces of development” in discussing the identity and its
formation.70
Erikson’s theory of identity-formation focuses on, inter alia, a
dynamic pathway of human psychology in which an individual human
being searches for, and eventually establishes, her genuine identity. This
dynamic pathway is based on a human being’s need to cope incessantly
with the inevitable conflicts between prior and subsequent
identifications with the environment as well as between the different
social roles that these identifications may carry with them. At first, a
child is “deeply and exclusively ‘identified’ with his parents.” 71
Subsequently, children also tend to “attach” themselves to other
particular adults around them, such as their teachers and parents of
their friends, and often imitate these adults’ occupations.72 Adolescence,
as the last stage of childhood, ends only when an individual replaces her
childhood identifications with a new type of identification resulting from
socialization and competition among its peers.73 Only after the “selective
repudiation and mutual assimilation of childhood identifications” are
attuned to a new configuration which the society recognizes will the true
identity of an individual is to be formed.
The final identity, although it includes all significant
identifications with key figures of the past, processes them in a way
which builds a “unique and reasonably coherent whole.”74 During the
final stage of identity formation, adolescents tend to suffer greatly from
role confusion.75 Past multiple identifications, and the roles which they
prescribe, often conflict with each other. This disturbance is tantamount

68 A.O. Rorty & D. Wong, Aspects of Identity and Agency, in IDENTITY, CHARACTER, AND
MORALITY: ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 19 (O. Flanagan & A.O. Rorty ed. 1990).
69 ERIKSON, supra note _ , at 114. See also Jane Kroger, Identity Formation, in THE
FUTURE OF IDENTITY: CENTENNIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE LEGACY OF ERIK ERIKSON 61-63
(Kenneth Hoover ed. 2004); JANE KROGER, IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT: ADOLESCENCE
THROUGH ADULTHOOD 25 (2nd ed. 2007).
70 KROGER, supra note _ , at 25.
71 ERIKSON, supra note _ , at 115.
72 Id., at 122.
73 Id., at 155.
74 Id., at 161.
75 Id., at 163-64.
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to a crisis or “a war within themselves.”76 Only after adolescents weather
this Strum und Drang do they acquire a sense of “knowing where [they
are] going.” 77 Then, they finally discover their “fittedness” in the
society.78 In this sense, the identity crisis is more of a “necessary turning
point,” rather than an “impending catastrophe.”79
However, identity formation is not always successful. Adolescents
often demonstrate a variety of pathological symptoms in the course of
identity formation. They may fail to resolve “strains” in their
engagement with others, which leads to a state of “a loss of center and a
dispersion.” 80 Erikson has labeled these pathologies as “identity
confusion” or “identity diffusion.” For example, they may make no
commitments, or show no fidelity, to their genuine identity as they
experience no identity crisis.81 They may also act baby-like (“diffusion of
time perspective”), become unable to work or concentrate (“diffusion of
industry”), or choose to be anti-social and hostile (“negative identity”).82
Other problematic identity statuses are “foreclosure,” in which
adolescents have already made commitments to a certain identity
without exploring various identities, and “moratorium,” in which
adolescents merely engage in such exploration without making any
commitments.83
C. Applying the Identity Theory to IOs
Similar to adolescents’ identity formation process, IOs also
experience certain socialization pressures from their environment and
are often forced to diversify their institutional selves into multiple roles
which should eventually be integrated into an internally coherent
identity.84 Naturally, the identity formation is not a smooth process for
either a human being or an IO. It may be accompanied by confusion,
fatigue and stress. In short, it is a crisis.
Id., at 17.
Id., at 165.
78 Id., at 161.
79 Id., at 16.
80 Id., at 212.
81 James E. Marcia, Development and Validation of Ego Identity Statuses, 3 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY. 551-558 (1966). To some scholars identity diffusion may be
characterized as “identity deficit” or “motivation crisis” which denotes a lack of
commitments and precise self-definition. Roy F. Baumeister et al., Two Kinds of
Identity Crisis, 53 J. PERSONALITY, 407, 409-11 (1985).
82 Id., at 167-73.
83 Id.
84 Susan Harter, Self and Identity Development, in AT THE THRESHOLD: THE
DEVELOPING ADOLESCENT 358 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds. 1990).
76
77
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As a legal person an IO’s identity crisis can be translated into a
normative process. As discussed above, identity-forming organizational
changes, which are inevitable for an IO’s institutional survival, are
basically teleological85 and constitutive since these changes define and
redefine its organizational goals, and thus regulate the behavior of
members and the organization itself.86 This teleological and constitutive
process is best captured by norms and legal discourse within an IO.
Legal principles and legal arguments mediate “intersubjective” or
“reflective” discourse and interaction among members, as well as
between members and the IO itself.87 In sum, norms provide, and alter,
the syntax and grammar of an IO’s institutional operation both in the
short-term, and in the long-term.
If an IO cannot survive its identity crisis, it fails to achieve its true
identity. First, in the face of challenges by the changing environment, it
may still remain attached to an old identification which has been
prescribed by its creators, i.e., states. This unresponsiveness to the
environment, which may be equivalent to “foreclosure” in human
psychology, eventually leads to “inefficient, self-defeating behavior.”88
Second, if an IO is confused by multiple identifications and fails to
commit itself to one coherent identity, its identity is diffused (“identity
diffusion”). Identity diffusion, as in foreclosure, is a pathological
symptom. It gravely reduces the output level of an IO. IOs may even
cease to exist due to these pathologies.89
D. Four Parameters of Identity Formation: History,
Environment, Purpose and Technology
The history of IOs renders an initial influence on their identities.
As an internalized past, the history tends to determine, or at least corelates with, present and future behaviors of IOs by frontloading their
rationale and character. Like DNAs in the human body, the
organizational history bestows upon IOs a certain institutional heredity,
which marks a unique path-dependence for each organization. The
organizational history is often used as an interpretive criterion for
Ness & Brechin, supra note _ , at 246.
Keohane, supra note _ , at 382.
87 See generally Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social
Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391 (1992).
88 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note _ , at 722-24. (discussing “insulation” as one of
IOs’ pathologies).
89 See Cheryl Shanks et al., Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International
Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992, 50 INT’L ORG. 593, 594 (1996) (observing
that IOs “do have a mortality rate, and it can be surprisingly high”).
85

86
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determining whether organizations’ or their participants’ behaviors are
permitted or prohibited under their charters or constitutions. 90
Interestingly, the tenacious impact of history on each IO’s identity
formation stems from the fact that it cannot be simply discarded or
disposed of even if it subsequently becomes obsolete or ineffective.
Purging an old organization and restarting afresh would be quite costly.
In this sense, all institutional changes tend to be path-dependent. “If
sunk costs make a traditional pattern of action cheaper, and if new
patterns are not more profitable enough to justify throwing away the
resource, the sunk costs tend to preserve a pattern of action from one
year to the next.”91 Old habits die hard. Relics of the old structure or
culture remain, even though they may be cocooned beneath a new
institutional coating.
However, this perspective on the organizational history need not
be static. To conventional IR theorists who emphasize the genesis,
rather than the subsequent change, of IOs, the organizational history is
nothing but a reflection, or a repository, of interests and preferences of
states at the time of creation. As a tool of these states used to achieve
certain goals, an IO is supposed to implement institutional blueprints
which were programmed into its history. At this stage, an IO is mostly
subordinate to states, and hence has little autonomy. (Figure 1) In
contrast, organizational sociologists and/or historical institutionalists
view organizational history as a dynamic factor which embodies “critical
junctures” in organizational development. 92 These critical historical
moments can trigger an irreversible path-dependence that is quite
different from the one that was pre-ordained by states. 93 In this
situation, an IO may gradually begin to exert its (new) identity upon
states (Figure 2). At a subsequent stage as this process deepens, and an
IO’s transformed identity prevails upon even the interests and
preferences of the powerful states who previously determined its old
identity. (Figure 3)

90 See e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties pmbl., May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 332, art. 32 (“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of
its conclusion, …”) (emphasis added).
91 ARTHUR. L. STINCHCOMBE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL THEORIES 120-21 (1968).
92 PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS
(2004); Kathleen Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 369 (1999).
93 Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol, Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary
Political Science, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 693 (Ira Katznelson &
Helen V. Milner eds. 2002).
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In sum, advocates for an IO’s autonomy/identity envisage a
seamless continuum in the IO’s evolution that is characterized by certain
critical junctures, or in a more normative sense, “constitutional
moments.” 94 The unique culture, structure and path-dependency of
each IO also begets a unique institutional arrangement, such as intergovernmental or supranational organization, which tends to mark and
define an IO’s identity. Therefore, from this standpoint, the process of
identity formation is a new history-making process.
The environment is a critical parameter to an organizational
identity. If one regards an IO as a closed system, a mere tool for states,
as conventional IR theorists do, then the environment may not matter
since an IO is only supposed to take what states provide (input) and
produce pre-programmed results (output). However, organizational
sociologists have long adhered to an open system where varying
environments exert critical impact on how organizations behave and
perform.95 This unremitting process of challenge and response between
an IO and the environment builds up its unique identity. An IO
processes complex information provided by the environment and forms
its identity in accordance with the messages contained in those
challenges.96 In this sense, the identity-formation process of an IO is an
assiduous dialogue with the environment.97
Helfer, supra note _ , at 662, n. 45.
HOWARD ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS _ (1979).
96 Yash P. Gupta & David C.W. Chin, Organizational Life Cycle: A Review and
Proposed Directions for Research, 30 MID-ATLANTIC J. BUS. 15 (1994).
97 See Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 623, 625
(2006) (viewing that “due to its dependence on and interaction with the broader
international legal system, it is not possible to analyse the WTO constitution fully
without analysing the broader structure”)
94

95
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Yet the environment provides IOs with not only opportunities but
also challenges. It forces IOs to change their identifications with the old
self embedded in the charter.98 It redefines the old self, which has lost
practicality and effectiveness due to obsolescence and desuetude. 99
From an economic perspective, this identity-formation process is a
function of altered opportunity costs in response to environmental
changes.100
An IO’s objective and purpose is the rationale of its existence.
Initially, it is given by an IO’s creators (states) and engraved in its
charter, as discussed above. Yet as an IO achieves its identity through
dynamic (historical) development, it also alters, or at least fine-tunes,
the original objective and purpose. In other words, organizational goals
must be adjustable for organizations to survive. 101 Empirical
confirmations for this goal dynamism are seen in the phenomena of
“mission creep” of major international organizations, such as the IMF
and the World Bank.102
An organizational identity shares the same developmental
pathway with an organizational goal. An organizational identity is
shaped by an IO’s conscious interactions with the environment, and
guided by an organization’s own role expectation as well as the
expectations the organization perceives from the environment (society).
This whole process of identity formation is driven by an organization’s
evolving notion of purpose that continuously builds throughout its
institutional lifetime. In this context, both goals and identities are
“cultural-cognitive and normative.” 103 Therefore, both goals and
identities steer, regulate and control IOs’ activities. Goals also provide
essential interpretive guidance when IOs’ determine whether a certain
action is acceptable. 104 In this regard, as Selznick noted, an

Shihata, supra note _ , at 218.
Id.
100 Keohane, supra note _ , at 390; DOUGLAS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN
ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981).
101 Ness & Brechin, supra note _ , at 264; Gouldner, supra note _ , at 404-05.
102 See e.g., Jessica Einhorn, The World Bank’s Mission Creep, 80 FOREIGN AFF.
(Sep./Oct. 2001) (arguing that member countries of the World Bank should control the
currently unwieldy status of mission creep by devolving some of its derivative missions
to other institutions and focus more on original, basic mission of the Bank); Sarah
Babb & Ariel Buira, Mission Creep, Mission Push and Discretion in Sociological
Perspective: The Case of IMF Conditionality, Paper presented at the XVIII G24
Technical Group Meeting, March 8-9, 2004, Geneva, Switzerland, available at
http://www.g24.org/012gva04.pdf (discussing the IMF’s expanded mandate over the
98
99

years).
103
104

SCOTT, supra note _ , at 22.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note _ , art. 31.
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organizational goal can be an “ideological weapon” with which to defy
opposition and mobilize support from the environment.105
Finally, an IO’s “core technology” 106 refers to its functional
capability to perform in order to achieve its goals. It delineates its
domain, and eventually its identity, by determining the “range of
products or services it provides and the types of clients or consumers
served.”107 The IMF’s identity as a financial organization is inextricably
linked to the fact that it is capable of monitoring and regulating
international financial flows. The identity of the World Health
Organization (WHO) as a health organization is also connected
inseparably to the fact that it can monitor and regulate health-related
matters, such as the distribution of flu vaccines. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s identity as a nuclear energy
organization hinges on the fact that it can monitor and regulate nuclear
energy issues, such as peaceful use of atomic energy.
As an open system, an organization can import technology from
its environment. 108 When interacting with its environment, it can
change the core technology by modifying its software (skills and other
social knowledge), humanware (personnel and bureaucrats) and
hardware (infrastructure and sub-organizations). 109 Organizational
theories characterize this transformative process of acquiring and
embracing new technologies as “organizational learning”. 110
Organizational learning is a purposeful behavior to increase IOs’
problem-solving (functional) capacities to achieve certain institutional
goals, and therefore plays a critical role in shaping organizational
identities.
IV. An Application of the Identity Theory: A Case of the World
Trade Organization (WTO)

PHILIP SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL
ORGANIZATION (1949); SCOTT, supra note _ , at 292.
106 SCOTT, supra note _ , at _.
107 Id., at 126; Sol Levine & Paul White, Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the
Study of Interorganizational Relationships, 5 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 583 (1961); Ness &
Brechin, supra note _ , at 256.
108 SCOTT, supra note _ , at 23.
109 Ness & Brechin, supra note _ , at 256.
110 See Bernd Siebenhüner: International Organisations as Learning Agents in the
Emerging System of Global Governance. A Conceptual Framework, at 16-17, GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE WORKING PAPER No 8, Potsdam, Berlin, Oldenburg: The Global
Governance Project, available at www.glogov.org.
105
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A. From a Contractual Tool (GATT) to an Autonomous
Organization (WTO)
As one of the many chapters of a much more ambitious yet
eventually aborted project of the International Trade Organization (ITO),
the GATT was originally more of a contractual document than an
organization. The GATT participants were named contracting parties,
rather than members. They created the GATT against the background of
mutually destructive protectionist trade policies in the interwar period,
which had diminished world trade by seventy percent and thus
contributed to the outbreak of World War II.111 Drawing on this bitter
historical lesson, contracting parties aimed to dismantle trade barriers
and achieve free trade by regularly holding tariff reduction talks in a
series of negotiation rounds provided by the GATT.
While trade negotiation was basically a reciprocal, diplomatic and
political exercise, contracting parties had to preserve the hard-won
delicate balance of concessions that each negotiation had produced. In
other words, they had to maintain the values of those concessions by
prohibiting parties from introducing any measures which might
neutralize them later. Such cheating had to be condemned, and
remedies instituted to restore the balance of concessions. Therefore, the
GATT, albeit a legal document, was basically a tool for contracting
parties that were pre-occupied by bargains’ original terms. This
instrumental, contractual structure of the GATT is evidenced by the
relics of private (contract) law embedded in the old GATT jurisprudence.
The remedial prototype of the GATT was “nullification or impairment,”
which is close to the notion of injuries or damages in contract law.
Regardless of whether the measure in question is consistent with GATT
norms, any injuries to a contracting party, i.e., the dilution of benefits of
its concession, should be remedied to preserve the balance of
concessions made in the previous negotiation.112 In this context, GATT
dispute resolution panels often explored whether and how much a
defendant’s measure brought actual adverse commercial effects to the
complainant.113
111 See Edward C. Luck, American Exceptionalism and International Organization:
Lessons from the 1990s, in U.S. HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE
UNITED STATES AND MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS 25, 39 (Rosemary Foot et al eds.
2003) (quoting remarks by the former U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky
on the U.S. trade policy and the WTO on Mar. 2, 2000).
112 See Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. PITT.
L. REV. 763, 766-67 (2004) (discussing the multilateral trading system (GATT/WTO)’s
institutional evolution from a negotiated contract to a legalized regime).
113 See e.g., Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machinery, Oct. 23,
1958, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60, ¶ 17, 20 (1959) [WTO Doc. Symbol
BISD/75/60].
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However, this instrumental (contractual) structure of the GATT
changed as it became more institutionalized and more equipped with
software (norms and practices), hardware (divisions and offices), and
humanware (personnel). The GATT began to focus more on the public
law aspect of its member states, such as the stability and predictability of
the rule of law.. As the former Director of the WTO Appellate Body
Secretariat Debra Steger aptly described, the GATT slowly evolved into
“something greater than a contract that could be withdrawn from by any
contracting party whenever it found the obligations too onerous.”114 In
the same line, the once critical notion of “nullification or impairment”
was weakened as it was assumed away whenever a panel found a
“violation.” 115 In fact, any violation would ipso facto constitute a
nullification or impairment. 116 This paradigm shift, from a poweroriented structure focusing on the outcome of negotiation to a ruleoriented structure valuing the legal system within the GATT, paved the
ground for a critical transformation from a contract to an
organization. 117 As Anne Krueger aptly observed, the WTO’s
organizational autonomy, i.e., its legal personality, tends to justify an
institutional evolution from the old GATT, which had been deemed an
instrument of contracting parties, to an independent organization.118
B. The WTO’s Identity Crisis
The legalization, or judicialization, of the GATT through its
dispute settlement system contributed greatly to its institutionalization.
Its panel system functioned quite effectively in resolving trade disputes
between contracting parties. Critically, the GATT not only resolved trade
disputes but also generated a rich set of jurisprudence in the area of
international trade law. The rule of law which the GATT established was
the most valuable product produced by the GATT as an organization.
This legalization, or rule of law, in the trade area enabled the GATT to
114 Debra P. Steger, Afterword: The "Trade and . . ." Conundrum-A Commentary, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 135, 137 (2002).
115 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210 (1980) [WTO Doc.
Symbol L/4907].
116 See United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, Jan. 17,
1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136, §§ 5.1.3-5.1.12 (1988) [WTO Doc. Symbol
L/6175].
117 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109-11 (2d ed. 1997).
118 Anne O. Krueger, Introduction, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 2
(Anne O. Krueger ed. 1998). But see Lisa L. Martin & Judith Goldstein, Legalization,
Trade Liberalization and Domestic Politics: a Cautionary Note, 53 INT’L ORG. 603
(2000).
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process information and further build up its unique technology, i.e.,
trade governance or trade management. Contracting parties increasingly
relied on the GATT in acquiring information and addressing various
problems concerning trade. In sum, the GATT consolidated its
identification with what it was meant to be, i.e., a trade agreement.
However, the environment surrounding the GATT was changing
dramatically in the 1980’s as the pro-trade bias of the GATT came under
attack. The rising ethos of the “welfare state” urged governments to
improve social hygiene in the areas of environment and human health.
The problem is that the proliferation of these social regulations might
have potentially undermined free trade goals since trade restriction due
to regulatory heterogeneity tends to become increasingly painful in
times of growing interdependence.119 Under certain circumstances, these
new domestic regulations, as non-tariff barriers (NTBs), can be abused
as a disguised form of protectionism.120
The GATT first defied the rising tide of (re-) regulation by striking
down these regulations as trade-restrictive. Although there existed the
general exception clause (GATT Article XX) under which these
regulations might be justified, not a single measure was ever actually
saved under the clause in the GATT’s history.121 For example, in 1990 a
A number of scholars have already paid attention to this phenomenon. For instance,
Sol Picciotto observed that:
“Regulatory regimes have been brought into greater interaction as the removal
of direct barriers to the flows of goods and money between states (tariffs,
quotas and exchange controls) has shifted attention towards regulatory
difference as a barrier to entry of commodities or capital.”
Sol Picciotto, The Regulatory Criss-Cross: Interaction between Jurisdictions and the
Construction of Global Regulatory Networks, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES 89 (William Bratton et al eds. 1996). Likewise, some
economists have also noted that:
“As globalization proceeds, however, it has become increasingly evident that
one nation’s economic policies can affect other countries. When nations were
separated by high trade barriers and trade flows were limited, one country
could ignore another nation’s domestic economic policies. As barriers have
come down, other countries’ domestic policies have become much more
important.”
GLOBAPHOBIA: CONFRONTING FEARS ABOUT OPEN TRADE 89 (Gary Burtless et al eds.
1998). See also Aaditya Mattoo, Discriminatory Consequences of Non-Discriminatory
Standards, WTO, WTO STAFF WORKING PAPERS, TISD-96-01, Dec. 1997, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/wpaps_e.htm (last visited on April 19,
2001).
120 See Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond
the Entropic Dilemma, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625, 643 (2005).
121 See Robert Howse, Managing the Interface between International Trade Law and
the Regulatory State: What Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the
Jurisprudence of the United States Dormant Commerce Clause, in REGULATORY
119
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GATT panel struck down the Thai ban on foreign cigarettes as
unnecessary trade restriction.122 In this case, the Thai government tried
to protect its people from a number of identifiable harms from
chemicals and toxins contained in foreign cigarettes by banning those
products. In fact, the WHO also endorsed such ban. However, the panel
ruled that the ban was an unjustifiable violation of the GATT rules since
the Thai government could have found less trade restrictive means than
the ban, such as the “strict, non-discriminatory labeling and ingredient
disclosure regulations.” 123 This ruling was severely criticized not only
because it ignored the WHO’s opinion but also because its prescription
to the Thai government, i.e., labeling and disclosure regulations, was
both unaffordable and ineffective for developing countries like Thailand
at that time.124
Therefore, while a pro-trade bias was faithful to the GATT’s
identification as a trade agreement, such a bias continuously invited
criticism from its environment, in particular the civil society and
environmental organizations. The GATT’s efforts to fix this bias and
achieve a more mature identity gathered critical momentum in the
launch of the WTO. The WTO’s mission statement in the preamble of its
charter spotlights “sustainable development.” It has become obvious
that due consideration and investment for non-trade values, such as the
environment and human health, should be made within the WTO in
order to achieve any development which is sustainable. One can
understand the creation of the Trade and Environment Committee and
special side agreements, such as the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS), as the WTO’s effort to grow out of the pro-trade bias
and form a more mature and responsive identity.125
Those who advocate a formal (hard) linkage between trade and
social values tend to argue that certain “social clauses,” which include
fundamental workers' rights or minimum international labor standards,

BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 142
(Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds. 2000).
122 Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, adopted
on Nov. 7, 1990, B.I.S.D. 37S/200.
123 Id., para. 77.
124 See e.g., David P. Fidler, Neither Science Nor Shamans: Globalization of Markets
and Health in the Developing World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 200-1 (1999)
(criticizing the Thai Cigarette panel’s interpretation of “necessary to protect human
health”).
125 See generally SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM
AGENDA OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (2003). See also Veijo Heiskanen, The
Regulatory Philosophy of International Trade, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 1 (2004).
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should be normatively incorporated into the WTO system.126 Under this
position, (rich) WTO members may restrict imports from other (poor)
members if the latter’s social conditions or practices violate these social
standards. Despite their ostensible moralistic streaks, these debates on
hard linkage are in fact testimonial to the WTO’s identity crisis. The
WTO is continuously receiving demands for these regulatory roles and is
thus exposed to different role identifications (with labor or
environmental organizations) beyond its base trade organization
identity. Perhaps the WTO might be a victim of its own success. The
unprecedented success of the GATT/WTO, in particular its dispute
settlement mechanism, tends to make many social issues gravitate
towards this trade organization.127 This gravitational force presses the
WTO to agonize over diverse role expectations.128
Critically, however, such hard linkage risks undermining the
WTO’s core values, i.e., free trade. 129 In other words, the WTO risks
suffering from a form of “identity diffusion.” If the WTO authorizes
members to freely restrict imports from other members which allegedly
violate those social standards, the WTO’s old identity as a trade
organization would be severely undermined since it would fail to uphold
trade values. At the same time, however, the WTO would not be
identified as a different regulatory (labor or environmental)
organization since the WTO’s contribution via hard linkage to those
social causes would nonetheless be questionable for the following
reasons.
In general, social standards are lower for developing countries
than developed countries simply because the former countries are
poorer than the latter. 130 Without addressing this inherent
126 See e.g., Virginia A. Leary, Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social
Clause (GATT, ILO, NAFTA, U.S. Laws), in Fair Trade and Harmonization (vol. 2) 177,
223 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds. 1996); Dani Rodrik, Developing
Countries after the Uruguay Round, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH
WORKING PAPER NO. 1084 (1994) (proposing a “social safeguards” clause based on core
labor rights in the WTO).
127 See Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96 AM J INTl L
28, 29 (2002); Sylvia Ostry, The WTO and International Governance, in THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION MILLENNIUM ROUND: FREER TRADE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
285, 290, 293 (Klaus Günter Deutsch and Bernhard Speyer, eds. 2001); José E. Alvarez,
How Not To Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade Regime, 7
WIDENER L SYMP J 1, 15 (2001).
128 Tomer Broude analyzed this problem in the area of trade and development. See
Tomer Broude, The Rule(s) of Trade and Rhetos of Development: Reflections on the
Functional and Aspirational Legitimacy of the WTO, 45 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 221
(2006).
129 See Kym Anderson, Environmental and Labor Standards: What Role for the WTO?,
in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 243-45 (Anne O. Krueger ed. 1998).
130 Id., at 244.
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developmental disparity, merely exerting sanctions on poor countries
would never achieve a satisfactory level of protection for putative
societal concerns. On the contrary, such ventures (hard linkage) will
only encroach on poor countries’ comparative advantages, such as cheap
labor, and thus generate serious tensions between rich and poor
countries without affecting the root cause of the problem. 131 Rich
countries may even be tempted to use these regulatory concerns as
convenient excuses for raising trade barriers, as seen in green or blue
protectionism.132 Then, the WTO will perform neither a trade nor a nontrade function, and its identity would therefore be lost. This would be
tantamount to identity diffusion for the WTO.
This risk of identity diffusion might also be found in yet another
linkage of “trade and development.” During its first decade, the WTO
has failed to narrow the income gap between the rich and the poor. The
least-developed countries’ marginalization from the mainstream global
trading system and the subsequent abject poverty in these countries
seriously questioned the rationale of the WTO. 133 This development
deficiency 134 drove the WTO towards yet another identification as it
launched the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in 2001. Yet, as Tomer
Broude observed, the rhetoric of a “development” round might not fully
match the technology (capacity) of the WTO.135 Nonetheless, if the WTO
attempts to achieve development goals by affording developing
countries rule exemptions in the name of “special and differential
treatment,” it might be counterproductive because it would eventually
hurt development by “discouraging effective efforts to integrate into the
world economy.”136
In confronting the risk of identity diffusion, some might argue
that the WTO should never be involved in these non-trade regulatory
issues, and instead focus on traditional narrow trade issues.137 Yet, this
impulsive reaction tends to usher in yet another risk of failed identity
Id.
See Reginald Dale, No 'Blue-Green' Protectionism, Please, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE,
Mar. 29, 1994. Cf. Gregory Shaffer, WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U.S.
Domestic Politics on Trade-Labor, Trade-Environment Linkages for the WTO's
Future, 24 FORDHAM INTL L J 608, 647-48 (2000) (critically observing that in the
absence of financial assistance to poor countries any radical linkage of labor or
environment to trade would be futile).
133 See generally, Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483 (2004).
134 Celso L. N. Amorim, The WTO from the Perspective of a Developing Country, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 95, 96-99 (2000) (discussing “development deficit” under the
WTO in the areas of agriculture and textiles).
135 Broude, supra note _ , at _.
136 J. Michael Finger & L. Alan Winters, What Can the WTO Do for Developing
Countries?, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 365, 390 (Anne O.
Krueger ed. 1998).
137 Anderson, supra note _ , at 245.
131
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formation, i.e., “foreclosure.” In other words, the WTO may be
preoccupied by its own “ritualized behavior,” i.e., its pro-trade bias,
which is totally unresponsive and unaccountable to the larger social
environment.138 Such “insulation” from its environment and refusal to
process the meaningful information provided by its environment tend to
undermine its legitimacy, and is thus detrimental to the organization’s
survival.139
C. Toward the WTO’s Identity Achievement
As is the case in a human individual, the WTO’s identity
formation or identity achievement is inseparable from its recognition of
its inevitable connectedness to its environment. The WTO is an open,
not a self-contained, system.140 The WTO interacts with, responds to,
and is even influenced by its environment. Importantly, however, the
WTO’s openness does not deprive itself of an “autopoietic” nature as an
organization which preserves its “operative closure.”141 The status quo of
the WTO in terms of its capacity (technology) and resources, which are
the very product of its hitherto institutional development, stipulates its
central identity as a trade organization. As of now, the WTO cannot, and
should not, become a human rights organization or an environmental
organization. The WTO may accommodate these non-trade values in
138 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note _ , at 718. See Robert Howse, From Politics to
Technocracy-and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading System, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 94 (2002) (criticizing the “insider network” under the GATT/WTO system);
Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on
the Internal and External Legitimacy of Dispute Settlement, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 334 (Roger B.
Porter et al. eds., 2001) (critically observing that internal legitimation within the trade
bureaucracy based on the diplomatic ethos tends to undermine the external
legitimation of the multilateral trading system); Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO
and Its Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 969, _ (2006)
(contending that “the effectiveness and legitimacy of the WTO depend on how it relates
to norms of other legal systems and on the nature and quality of its relationships with
other international organizations”).
139 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note _ , at 722. Cf. Peter M. Gerhart, The Two
Constitutional Visions of the World Trade Organization, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1,
3 (2003) (critically observing that the “inward-looking, economic” vision of the WTO
could not gain broad support and thus should be replaced by the “external,
participatory” vision aligned with pluralistic, democratic decision-making).
140 See Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and Its Law in the International Legal
Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 969 (2006)(observing that “the WTO is well aware of the
existence of other systems of norms and of the fact that it is not acting alone in the
international sphere.”).
141 Richard Nobles & David Schiff, Introduction, in NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL
SYSTEM 8 (Fatima Kastner et al. eds 2004).
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various ways by voluntarily adjusting its own internal legal and
institutional choices in the course of its evolution.142 Yet these non-trade
values must not be “imposed” on the WTO externally as they force the
WTO to accept norms and consequences which are inconsistent with its
current identity.143
Therefore, a desirable form of identity formation for the WTO will
be to attain an institutional equilibrium between trade and non-trade
(social) regulatory values without losing its character as a trade
organization. This equilibrium means reconciliation between trade and
social values from the WTO’s perspective as a trade organization. This
reconciliation should be based on the WTO’s institutional capacity, its
core technology and its own path-dependency. In symbolic rhetoric, the
agenda should be “trade and labor or environment” not “labor or
environment and trade.” The WTO’s core technology, such as its
software (jurisprudence) and hardware (committees), is capable of
performing such reconciliation.
First of all, via its constructive (teleological) interpretation, the
WTO tribunal can harmonize trade and social values without losing the
WTO’s main character. In paradigmatic cases such as Gasoline (1996)144
and Shrimp-Turtle (1998),145 the WTO tribunal bestowed on domestic
regulators broad discretion in establishing the content of domestic
regulations, while it focused only on the manner in which they were
applied.146 Under this case law, WTO members can freely pursue their
non-trade (social) policy objectives as long as they adhere to certain
basic (procedural) disciplines, such as good faith and due process. This
hermeneutics is teleological in the sense that it was driven by the WTO’ s
new telos, “sustainable development,” which is nothing but the WTO’s
new commitment to a more balanced organizational identity than the
old GATT.
Therefore, these rulings represent a mature departure from the
GATT’s narrow identification with a pro-trade bias, which, if left
unchecked, would have led to “foreclosure” as a failure of identity
Id.
See generally Sungjoon Cho, WTO’s Identity Crisis, GLOBAL LAW BOOKS,
http://www.globallawbooks.org/reviews/detail.asp?id=53 (Jan. 31, 2006), reprinted
in 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 298 (2006).
144 WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, United States--Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc No WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr 29, 1996) [hereinafter
Gasoline].
145 WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, United States--Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc No WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct 12, 1998)
[hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle].
146 Id., paras. 146-86 (regarding the so-called “chapeau test”). See SUNGJOON CHO, FREE
MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM AGENDA OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM
45-62 (2003).
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formation. In these cases, the WTO no longer dismissed social (human
health) values in a blind pursuit of trade values as it did in Thai
Cigarette. In Shrimp-Turtle, the WTO tribunal referred to non-trade
(environmental) conventions, such as the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), in a
serious effort to locate a common ground between the WTO and those
environmental treaties.147
Another way of embracing social values within the WTO without
diffusing its identity is to pursue quasi-harmonization through
international regulatory standards. Any hard regulatory bargaining
within the WTO that aims for a single undertaking would be infeasible
simply due to the WTO’s lack of core technology in these regulatory
areas as well as the politically combustible nature of those target
regulations.148 A more realistic way is to utilize the WTO’s pre-existing
hardware, such as the Trade and Environment Committee and the SPS
Committee, is to encourage WTO members to tap relevant international
regulatory standards. 149 These committees, if well operated, can
contribute greatly to regulatory dialogue among WTO members and
effectively address the subtle interface between trade and regulatory
issues. At the same time, in these committee activities the WTO can coopt relevant international regulatory organizations, such as the
International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”), the
International Electrotechnical Commission (“IEC”), and the "Codex
Alimentarius Commission."
Finally, such reconciliation may also be manifested as
“coherence” in policy-making between the WTO and other relevant IOs.
For example, the World Bank can help the WTO finance “technical
assistance” projects, such as the training of government officials, to
build the regulatory capacity of developing countries.150 The WTO and
other IOs can also perform a joint study that identifies areas of common
concerns and interests. The recent WTO-ILO joint study, “Trade and
Employment: Challenges for Policy Research,” offers a good example in
this regard. 151 By identifying common interests and concerns of both
organizations as well as defining a relationship between trade and
employment, this type of joint study provides a fertile ground for policy
Shrimp-Turtle, supra note _ , paras. 130, 132.
But see Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L J
303, 307-08 (2004) (arguing for a grand regulatory bargaining within the WTO).
149 See Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond
the Entropic Dilemma, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625 (2005).
150 See Gary P. Sampson, Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking: A
WTO Perspective, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 257, 265 (Anne O.
Krueger ed. 1998).
151 WTO & ILO, TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT: CHALLENGES FOR POLICY RESEARCH (2007).
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coherence between trade and non-trade values. Under this nuanced
approach, the WTO can maintain fidelity to its identity as a trade
organization while still responding to its increasingly demanding
environment.
V. Conclusion
This Essay argues that an IO, like a human being, is prone to the
process of identity formation in establishing its autonomy from its
members (states). As it undergoes various institutional changes, its old
identification with an original goal may encounter a new identification
with another purpose, and thus it may experience confusion as to its
true identity (identity crisis). An IO can achieve a coherent institutional
self by striking a balance between these multiple identifications under
the constraints which various parameters, such as its environment and
technology, impose. Yet an IO may also fail to achieve its identity by
insulating itself from its environment (foreclosure) or being adrift in the
middle of these multiple identifications without making any
commitment to a final identity (identity diffusion).
This identity theory of IOs may find in the WTO its empirical
confirmation. As an organic institution which incessantly interacts with
its environment, the WTO has evolved from the early GATT which was
defined largely by a pro-trade character to the WTO whose identity
formation has been influenced by a strong external demand for a new
identification with non-trade (societal) values, such as protection of the
environment and human health. The WTO’s identity formation is to
strike an institutional equilibrium between traditional trade values and
these non-trade values.
Admittedly, this Essay offers little explanation on a microscopic,
internal dynamics as to how social actors (states) of an IO affect or
contribute to its identity formation process. This question should be
answered by future research which will re-discover conventional IR
theories in an attempt to build a more comprehensive, and universal,
theory of IOs’ institutional changes.
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Annex
The identity achievement as an institutional equilibrium is
determined by a confluence of two forces, i.e., the extent to which trade
values are realized as a trade organization (“effectiveness”) and the
extent to which certain non-trade values are pursued to respond to
external demands (“responsiveness”). Given a limited amount of
institutional resources, an optimal level of identity is a function of the
marginal benefit (MB) of responsiveness and marginal cost (MC) of
effectiveness. (Figure 4) Other things being equal, if the WTO’s general
level of responsiveness increases, e.g., if the WTO devotes more time
and energy to enhance non-trade values, the WTO’s trade-oriented
output tends to decrease, and thus the WTO becomes less effective as a
trade organization, even if its identity may be formed at an increased
degree of linkage. (Figure 5)152 This decreased level of effectiveness may
be translated as the price the WTO pays to be more responsive.
Therefore, WTO members should beef up the WTO’s institutional
capacity with additional resources, such as money and personnel, in
order to increase both levels of responsiveness and effectiveness without
necessarily compromising each other. (Figure 6) This conclusion may
apply both to non-trade, societal concerns, such as labor and
environment, and to new areas added in the Uruguay Round, such as the
intellectual property rights (TRIPS). In other words, with more
investment in these areas within the WTO, it may maintain a decent
output level as a trade organization, while it can contribute to the better
protection of labor, environment, and intellectual property rights.

Cf. Manfred Elsig, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis: What Does
the Beast Look Like?, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 75, 79-80 (2007)(warning that the WTO’s
institutional redesign to meet concerns of legitimate governance could lead to
hampered output efficiency).
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[Figure 4]
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[Figure 5]
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[Figure 6]
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